What difficulty arises when we claim that propositions about future events lack truth values?

When discussing propositions about future events and their lack of truth values, the relevant difficulty is that claiming they lack truth values can hinder our ability to assert the truth of past statements. This is because if future propositions, such as predictions or expectations, do not possess truth values, it raises philosophical questions about how time affects the nature of truth itself.

For instance, if we posit that a statement about the future is neither true nor false until the event occurs, this can create a paradoxical situation when we attempt to discuss or reflect on the truth of past events. In philosophical discourse, this leads to challenges regarding our understanding of time and how we evaluate statements made in the past which may have implications for what will happen in the future.

Moreover, this position could imply that truth itself is mutable or dependent on temporal context, thereby complicating our grasp on the stability and objectivity of statements about the past. Understanding this aligns with philosophical discussions about the nature of truth in relation to time and events, making clear why claiming future propositions lack truth values can significantly impact how we think about truth regarding past events.