If every proposition is true or false, what can be said about the events or objects concerning those propositions?

The assertion that every proposition is either true or false aligns with the principle of bivalence in classical logic. This principle suggests that for any statement, regardless of complexity, it can only occupy one of two truth values: true or false.

When propositions take the form of declarative sentences about events or objects, these entities must either exist in a certain state when the proposition is true or not exist when the proposition is false. For instance, if the proposition is "The cat is on the mat" is true, there must be a cat in existence on the mat. Conversely, if the proposition is false, it indicates that the described relationship does not hold, which implies that either the cat does not exist or is not on the mat.

This connection between propositions and the existence of events or objects underscores the necessity of their ontological status. Their being either true or false requires that the entities referred to in these propositions must have a specific state: existence (for true propositions) or non-existence (for false propositions). Thus, asserting that the events or objects in question either exist or do not exist aligns directly with the implications of the bivalence principle.